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Information security: listening to the perspective of organisational insiders 
Abstract 
Aligned with the strategy-as-practice research tradition, this paper investigates how 
organisational insiders understand and perceive their surrounding information security 
practices, how they interpret them, and how they turn such interpretations into 
strategic actions. The study takes a qualitative case study approach, and participants 
are employees at the Research & Development department of a multinational original 
brand manufacturer. The paper makes an important contribution to organisational 
information security management. It addresses the behaviour of organisational 
insiders ± a group whose role in the prevention, response and mitigation of information 
securit\ LQFLGHQWV LV FULWLFDO 7KH SDSHU LGHQWLILHV D VHW RI RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LQVLGHUV¶
perceived components of effective information security practices (organisational 
mission statement; common understanding of information security; awareness of 
threats; knowledge of information security incidents, routines and policy; relationships 
between employees; circulation of stories; role of punishment provisions; and training), 
based on which more successful information security strategies can be developed. 
Keywords  
Information security; organisational insiders; information security awareness; strategy 
as practice 
1. Introduction 
With the rapid advancement of computer-based information systems and the occurrence of 
security-related incidents (e.g. acts of human error negligence, deliberate software attacks, 
software failures, espionage, deliberate acts of trespass, sabotage), information security 
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PDQDJHPHQWKDVEHFRPHDQXQDYRLGDEOHDVSHFWRIFRQWHPSRUDU\RUJDQLVDWLRQV¶RSHUDWLRQV>
2, 3]. Organisations are aware of the threats to information systems security, in particular cyber 
attacks [4] and the infringement of confidential data [5]. Previous research has significantly 
focused on the technical controls of information security [6, 7] and it is often argued that early 
information systems security studies approach perceptions of security from a technology 
acceptance angle [8]. However, experts growingly argue that the main cause for information 
security incidents lies mainly ZLWKHPSOR\HHV¶EHKDYLRXUDOIDFWRUVUDWKHUWKDQWHchnical issues 
per se, which implies a turn to internal problems attributed to the users of information systems 
[9, 10]. In more recent research, practitioners have studied information security management 
IRFXVLQJRQLQVLGHUV¶VHFXULW\EHKDYLRXUDQGDWWLWXdes in the context of organisational culture 
[11, 12]. 
This paper is located within this emergent stream of research in that it is concerned with the 
perceptions of information security practices held by ordinary organisational insiders (i.e. full-
time employees, part-time employees and temporary workers) who have access to both an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V FULWLFDO RSHUDWLRQDO LQIRUPDWLRQ DQG LWV LQIRUPDWLRQ V\VWHPV 0RUHRYHU WKH
paper attempts to introduce contextual innovation by investigating the perceptions of 
employees within the R&D department of a multinational original brand manufacturer (OBM), 
KHQFHIRUWKUHIHUUHG WRDV7H[WLOHĮGLVJXLVHGQDPH7KLV LVSDUWLFXODUO\ LPSRUWDQWDV5	'
GHSDUWPHQWVDUHDWWKHFRUHRIILUPV¶NQRZOHGJHIORZV>@ILUPV¶DELOLW\to generate product 
LQQRYDWLRQ>@DQGILUPV¶FDSDFLW\WRLQFUHDVHYDOXHDGGHG>@,QFLGHQWVZLWKRUJDQLVDWLRQDO
insiders who disclose sensitive information [16] are challenging for R&D departments, with 
severe impacts on productivity, revenue, and reputation. Equally challenging are the emergent 
managerial problems associated to the increased adoption of boundary spanning organisational 
practices and technologies that emphasise information sharing, networking and mobility [17]. 
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Security is not employed in this study in connection with legal protection mechanisms such 
as IPR mechanisms and related contractual issues [18] and focuses instead on the processes of 
securing organisational information integrity and confidentiality [19] yet ensuring it is 
available to relevant organisational actors when needed. Typically information security deals 
with a variety of solutions that prepare against and/ or respond to threats to information such 
as information leaks to competitors and knowledge loss through staff turnover [20]. Such 
threats inform the design of formal and informal protection measures that share as a common 
starting point the clear identification of critical information assets [21]. The appropriate 
recognition of which information sustains business value creation is a specific managerial 
capability and requires an articulation of the role of information in the business, combined with 
the specification of practices that deal with how that information should be secured [22]. 
In order to address the theoretical and practical issues identified in the problem statement 
introduced above, this paper aims to extend information security theory by exploring 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQVLGHUV¶SHUFHLYHGFRPSRQHQWVRIHIIHFWLYHLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHV7KH
focus is therefore on the make-up of effective information security practices from the 
HPSOR\HH¶V SRLQW RI YLHZ HOLFLWHG WKURXJK WKH RYHUDOO TXHVWLRQ RI µZKDW GR RUJDQLVDWLRQDO
LQVLGHUVZDQWDQGZK\"¶6XFKDQLQYHVWLJDWLRQRIKRZRUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQVLGHUVXQGHUVWDQGDQd 
perceive their surrounding information security practices, how they interpret them, and how 
they turn these interpretations into strategic actions corresponds to what Vaara and 
Whittinghton [23] describe as uncovering the taken for granted practices that shape strategy 
work. This endeavour is aligned with the strategy-as-practice research tradition, and its focus 
RQWKHZD\VLQZKLFKRUJDQLVDWLRQDODFWRUV¶GHFLVLRQVDQGDFWLRQVDUHHQDEOHGE\RUJDQLVDWLRQDO
and social practices. 
A practice approach to the study information security in organisations is particularly timely 
and responds to calls for the examination of the micro-practices and everyday routines of 
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strategy formation [24]. These micro-practices and daily routines that are the locus of strategy 
formation comprehend a variety of interconnected elements ± cognitive activities, know how, 
emotional states, motivational knowledge, constitution of symbolic constructs such as 
organisational procedures [25, 26, 27], which are often absent from the dominant strands of 
information security research that rely essentially on the adaptation of perspectives borrowed 
from reference disciplines (e.g. economics, psychology, criminology) and tend to replicate 
extant theories (e.g. deterrence theory, theory of planned behaviour, protection motivation 
theory). On the other hand, from a practice perspective, organisational phenomena such as 
information security strategy are understood not as immanent properties, but as doings and 
social practices in which individuals actively engage. There is therefore a substantial affinity 
between the practice perspective and the Weickian tradition of examining the processes of 
organising, making sense, and enacting reality [28]. 
In terms of structure, following the presentation of the research area and proposed practice 
approach in the current section, the following section offers a theoretically sensitising review 
of the literature [29] on information security (with a focus on purpose, policy and culture). 
Section 3 introduces the empirical context of the study and describes the methodology. Section 
4 presents the results in a narrative that illustrates the themes identified through inductive 
thematic analysis with the voice of organisational insiders ± conveyed in the form of interview 
excerpts. Finally, a discussion of findings is provided in Section 5, while Section 6 presents 
conclusions.  
 
2. Information security 
The mitigation of security threats towards information assets attributable to both outsiders and 
insiders has become an important area of organisational strategy [17, 30, 31, 32, 33]. 
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Organisations increasingly focus on implementing information security products such as anti-
virus, intrusion detection and prevention systems, total PC security, database/contents security, 
total security systems and public key infrastructure [6, 7]. However, alongside technical 
measures, information security requires a strategy that orchestrates structured actions, policy 
and governance in order to protect organisational information assets [34]. Indeed, despite the 
prevalence of technical security [32] measures, studies have reported that internal security 
incidents continue to happen and create more damage and losses than security incidents caused 
by outsiders [35, 36]. Recent research goes as far as reporting that approximately half of all 
information security violations can be attributed to the behaviour of organisational insiders 
[37]. Such results demonstrate the relevance of focusing on the user behavioural dimensions 
and on the socio-organisational aspects of information security resilience. 
$EXQGDQWUHVHDUFKKDVIRFXVHGRQXVHUV¶LQIRUPDWLRQEHKDYLRXULQRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVHWWLQJV
usually under names such as misuse, compliance or violation of information systems security 
policies. However, from a theoretical perspective, previous information security research has 
been relatively poor in theory development, and has mostly borrowed constructs that were 
originally developed for other disciplines, (e.g. economics, criminology, psychology) such as 
rational choice theory [38, 39, 40], deterrence theory [41, 42], protection motivation theory 
[43], neutralization theory [44], or theory of planned behaviour [45]. This development in the 
OLWHUDWXUHJRHVKDQGLQKDQGZLWKRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶FRQFHUQVDERXWVHFXrity incidents and how they 
can have negative effects on their competitiveness. More than targeting system or application 
vulnerabilities, a growing number of security intrusions now tend to focus on and exploit 
vulnerabilities in the behaviour of organisational insiders [46]. Recent research has focused on 
information security incidents which can be attributed to human factors such as malicious 
intention, negligence, a lack of knowledge and communication, and flawed information 
security policy [9, 47, 48, 49].  
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Information security has evolved together with the rapid changes of technology and society. 
The technological and societal developments have impelled many organisations to the 
development of information security management. The International Standard on Information 
Security (ISO 27000) defines LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\LQWKHEXVLQHVVFRQWH[WDV³WKHSURWHFWLRQ
of information from a wide range of threats in order to ensure business continuity, minimize 
business risk and maximize return on investments and EXVLQHVVRSSRUWXQLWLHV´>@ The ISO 
27000 series provides organisations with standards for information security management. 
Within the series, the ISO 27002 standard provides recommendations on the management of 
information risks through information security controls, including clauses that address 
specifically the social aspects of information security management (e.g. clause 6 on 
µ2UJDQL]DWLRQRI,QIRUPDWLRQ6HFXULW\¶DGGUHVVHVWKHQHHGWRDOORFDWHFOHDUO\GHILQHGUROHVDQG
responsibilities for information security management processes and activities; clause 7 on 
µ+XPDQ5HVRXUFH6HFXULW\¶IRFXVHVRQHPSOR\HHV¶DQGFRQWUDFWRUV¶DZDUHQHVVDQGIXOILOPHQW
of their information security responsibilities; clause 8 on µ$VVHW0DQDJHPHQW¶DGGUHVVHVWKH
need to identify organisational assets and define SURWHFWLRQUHVSRQVLELOLWLHVFODXVHRQµ$FFHVV
&RQWURO¶ IRFXVHVRQ OLPLWLQJDFFHVV WR  LQIRUPDWLRQDQG LQIRUPDWLRQSURFHVVLQJ IDFLOLWLHV WR
protect against accidental damage, loss and other threats). [51] 
 In many studies, organisational information has been conceptualised as a fundamental asset 
and therefore researchers have made consistent effort in assuring information security to 
SURWHFWRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶LQWHUHVWVDQGPLQLPLVHULVNVWRLQIRUPDWLRQDVVHWV[9, 10]. 
In addition, information security can be viewed as the process involved in keeping 
information secure. This is through offering protection to its privacy, integrity and availability 
and through managing with responsibility, integrity, trust and ethicality (RITE) principles for 
successfully securing the information assets within organisations [9]. For information security 
to be effective, it should involve technology, security products, procedures and policies. There 
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is no single collection of products that can address every issue pertaining to information 
security [52]. Various products are currently in place aimed at addressing issues related with 
information security. Such products include vulnerability scanners, firewalls and intrusion 
detection systems. However, it is important to note that such products alone cannot adequately 
address information security challenges [53]. 
Information security in its basic form is more of a process. The initial step in information 
security is the development of an information systems security policy. An information systems 
security policy refers to a set of guidelines that are well-defined and documented, which 
provide a description of the ways in which any organisation manages, offers protection to its 
information assets and plans future decisions concerning the security of its information systems 
infrastructure [9, 54]. A document describing security procedures outlines precisely how to go 
about accomplishing specific tasks [55] and how to protect information systems from rising 
levels of security threats [56]. Moreover, information security policies give employees 
guidelines on the acceptable use of computer resources alongside with a determination of 
penalties that can result from non-adherence to those guidelines [57]. 
In historical terms, there are many ways of describing the development of information 
security over the past decades. One of the ways of mapping this development is by analysing 
the waves that signify specific trends. These waves consist of the technical wave, the 
management wave, the institutionalisation wave, the governance wave, and the cyber security 
wave. The first wave, signifying a technical approach to information security, is based on the 
main frame. It considers information security as something that could easily be addressed by 
use of the features that are inbuilt into the mainframe operating system such as passwords, 
user-ids and access control lists. The second wave, management approach, attracted the 
involvement of top management with the emergence of distributed computing. This wave of 
information security brought about information security policies and also the organisational 
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structures addressing information security. The outcome of this wave was that it succeeded in 
gaining the attention of managers and therefore contributed to an overall improvement of 
organisational information security. The third wave, institutionalisation approach, introduced 
major improvements in information security. This wave is made up of different components, 
ZKLFK LQFOXGH ³LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ VWDQGDUGL]DWLRQ´ ³LQWHUQDWLRQDO FHUWLILFDWLRQ RI
LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\´ DQG ³FXOWLYDWLQJ VHFXULW\ FXOWXUH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ throughout an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ´>]. The fourth wave refers to the processes leading to the explicit inclusion of 
information security as a core component of good corporate governance. Finally, the fifth wave 
refers to the professionalisation of information security practitioners as a fundamental step in 
the protection against threats raised by Internet-based systems [59].  
The standardisation of information security involves adhering to internationally recognised 
standards for information security. International information security certification addresses 
the question of how to go about proving information security readiness to an electronic business 
partner. Processes of information security compliance assist organisations in carrying out 
comparisons between their real information security operations and international information 
security management standards. The purpose of compliance is to evaluate and carry out audits 
on de facto organisational practices vis a vis the standards [60]. Assessing the degree of 
compliance assists organisations in determining their adherence to the controls defined in the 
standards. Compliance with standards that are internationally recognised is a common basis for 
measuring information security. It is therefore vital for organisations to regularly evaluate their 
information security levels against internationally recognised standards [12]. 
Finally, cultivating an information security culture addresses the security challenges that 
emerge mainly from the behaviour of organisational insiders. Security culture is vital to an 
organisation as employees may pose threats to information security [58]. Therefore, a balance 
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of people, process and technology is required to improve organisDWLRQV¶LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\
[61]. 
2.1. Information security culture 
Culture can be conceptualised as a set of common understandings that are expressed in shared 
patterns of action and meaning, such as a common language. In context of information security, 
culture is vital and research has established that it has an impact on information security 
outcomes [47, 62]. Furthermore, through understanding and encouraging a security culture in 
organisations where the integrity of information as an asset is a vital factor for success can help 
maintain and enhance their reputation [63]. 
Culture has influenced the creation of numerous security instruments such as information 
ethics guidelines, national security policy, and security training [64]. The scope of security 
culture includes ethical and social dimensions that are meant to enhance the security-related 
conduct of employees. Information security culture, as a subset of the overall culture of an 
organisation, should offer support to all organisational tasks in such a manner that information 
security becomes a normal aspect of employeHV¶ GDLO\ ZRUNSODFH URXWLQHV >]. This 
contribution is particularly relevant when FRQVLGHULQJWKDWHPSOR\HHV¶OLPLWHGNQRZOHGJHRI
information security challenges can lead to vulnerabilities and serious incidents [66]. In order 
WR PLWLJDWH HPSOR\HHV¶ OLPLWHG NQRZOHGJH RI LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ WKUHDWV FRPSUHKHQVLYH
programmes of awareness and training are developed with a strong emphasis on culture, since 
there is a recognition that it is not possible to address the human dimension of information 
security by the simple use of procedural and technical approaches [67].  
Zakaria and Gani [68] developed an information security culture framework through 
adapting the organisational culture typology proposed by Schein [69], and its three levels: 
artifacts, espoused values and shared tacit assumptions. Each level has been developed to 
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evaluate the elements of information security culture in organisations: the first level - surface 
manifestations - includes physical security and any visible and audible security 
implementation. The second level - values - includes information security policy, standards, 
procedures and guideline documents. The third level - basic assumptions - includes the implicit 
DVVXPSWLRQVXQGHUO\LQJHPSOR\HHV¶EHKDYLRXUWRZDUGVLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\RQKRZWRLQVSHFW
protect, detect, react ad reflect. At the level of values, information security policies are 
particularly helpful in operating the conversion of tacit knowledge held by senior managers 
LQWR H[SOLFLW NQRZOHGJH WKDW FDQ IDFLOLWDWH HPSOR\HHV¶ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ Rf roles and 
responsibilities [70]. At the level of basic assumptions, employee socialisation and sharing of 
knowledge are vital to trigger processes of individual and organisational learning [71]. Through 
focusing on communication, feedback and motivation, such practices reinforce the assimilation 
of values disseminated by policy [72]. 
'LIIHUHQWRUJDQLVDWLRQDOIDFWRUVPD\LQWHUDFWZLWKRUJDQLVDWLRQV¶LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\FXOWXUH
across the different levels it manifests itself. On the one hand, top management commitment 
and leadership exert strong influences on the values held by organisational insiders [73]. One 
the other hand, organisational size and industry sector may add more nuances to an 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\FXOWXUH6PDOOHURUJDQLVDWLRQVDUH OHVVOLNHO\WR LQYHVW LQ
information security due to budget and time constraints [74]. Similarly, top managers in smaller 
organisations tend to give less support to the development of information security culture, 
partly due to the fact that security breaches are usually not reported, which leads to 
organisational insiders failing to fully understand the importance of information security [66]. 
Variations in industry type are also relevant, with information services, finance and insurance 
sectors being more aware, investing more, and making greater efforts to develop an 
organisation-wide information security culture [74]. 
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3. Method and data 
*LYHQ WKH UHODWLYHO\ HPHUJHQW VWDWH RI NQRZOHGJH ZLWK UHVSHFW WR RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LQVLGHUV¶
perceptions of information security practices and culture, this paper takes an inductive thematic 
analysis approach that emphasises thick description and categorisation, as opposed to 
hypothesis testing and theory confirmation. 
Therefore, from a research philosophy perspective, this research is interpretive. 
Interpretivists assume that human activity is subjective, that reality is inter-subjective, and that 
only a research approach focused on the richness of subjective experiences rather than on 
objectivity and generalisation can contribute to explore and understand the human actors, 
cultures and phenomena [75]. Accordingly, it is assumed that an interpretive approach will 
IDFLOLWDWHDGHHSHUXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGUHFRJQLWLRQRIVWDNHKROGHUV¶SHUVSHFWLYHVDQGWKHVRFLDO
political and cultural aspects that surround them [76].  
In terms of research design, a single case study design [77] is chosen not to accentuate 
JHQHUDOLVDELOLW\ EXW UDWKHU WR FDUHIXOO\ H[DPLQH RUJDQLVDWLRQDO HYHQWV WKDW H[KLELW ³WKH
operation of some identified genHUDO WKHRUHWLFDO SULQFLSOHV´ >]. This fits well with our 
motivation to identify effective components of information security efforts, as perceived by 
organisational insiders, and is aligned with the role of single case study research as allowing to 
more clearly understand and explain variables that escape cross-sectional quantitative research 
[79]. Therefore, the findings do not reflect the statistical conception of generalisability and are 
LQVWHDGDOLJQHGZLWKWKHQRWLRQRI³DQDO\WLFDOJHQHUDOLVDWLRQ´ZKLFKis determined by the extent 
WRZKLFKILQGLQJVFDQEH³XVHGDVJXide to what might occur´in similar socio-organisational 
settings [80]. Accordingly, the resulting outcome of the detailed case analysis is a set of 
thematic propositions that are suggestive of theory. Furthermore, the use of case studies is well 
established in the disciplines of Information Science [81, 82, 83], Management of Technology 
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and Innovation [84, 85, 86], and Information Systems [87, 88, 89]. It has been described as 
SDUWLFXODUO\³DSSURSULDWHIRUVWXG\LQJVWDWHRIWKHDUW,6TXHVWLRQVLQDQDWXUDl setting´>8]. 
3.1. The case company 
7H[WLOHĮLVD6RXWK.RUHDQPHGLXP-sized original brand manufacturing firm (OBM)1, with its 
main office located in South Korea, and two manufacturing branches based in the Philippines 
and in Vietnam. The firm comprises 300 employees. It has been consistently enjoying sales 
JURZWKDQGSURILWDELOLW\DQGLWKDVEHHQUDQNHGDPRQJVWWKHFRXQWU\¶VWRSPDQXIDFWXUHUVRI
textile accessories, more specifically sports equipment and backpacks. Because of its strong 
emphasis on design, WKHUHLVDJHQHUDOFRQVHQVXVWKDWWKH5	'GHSDUWPHQWLVYLWDOIRUWKHILUP¶V
success: it develops new products, improves existing products, and above all handles 
confidential information such as production techniques, customer and partner information, and 
SURGXFWV¶FRQFHSWVDQGSURWRW\SHV 
Similarly to the analysis performed by Nelson [91@RQ LQGXVWULDO5	'5	'DW7H[WLOHĮ
takes place at an in-house specialised laboratory that concentrates a group of individuals trained 
in science and engineering, and whose primary mission is to introduce technical change. Their 
location and high degree of specialisation signify that they are simultaneously close enough to 
solve shop-floor problems (in the sense that they too are organisational insiders), yet 
sufficiently distant not to be consumed by routine issues that would stand in the way of their 
UROHDVWKHFRPSDQ\¶VIRUPDOOHDUQLQJXQLW,QHIIHFWWKLVOHDUQLQJFDSDFLW\RIRUJDQLVHG5	'
is described in the literature as a combination of learning (e.g. acting as a gatekeeper of new 
information) and creating roles (e.g. through incorporating new components, materials, and 
manufacturing methods into an established product) [91, 92, 93]. Of particular importance here 
is the role played by design, more specifically independent design capability that allows 
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products that stand within stable technology frontiers to move upwards in the value-chain [94], 
notably through the development of proprietary product-designs. 
In order to better align security goals with business goals 7H[WLOHĮLQWHJUDWHVLQIRUPDWLRQ
technology with physical security: alongside operating physical entry controls for the 
information technology facilities that operate core business activities (i.e. key card accessible 
facilities), it maintains audit logs rHFRUGLQJV\VWHPV¶XVHUDFWLRQVLQDQLQWHJUDWHGVHUYHUORJ
Other technical solutions in place to mitigate information security threats include the use of 
network-attached storage (NAS) array for multimedia files archiving and disaster recovery; 
and the enforcement of network access control (NAC) that followed the occurrence of virus 
attacks. 
3.2. Data collection and data analysis 
Data collection developed through semi-structured interviews with informants from various 
levels of the R&D department in order to cross-check the reliability of data. Emerging 
theoretical construction derived from data analysis has also lead us to engage in interviews 
with the Director of the Strategic Planning Department, and the Director of the Computing 
Division. In total, we conducted a total of 10 interviews, as shown in Table 1. Each interview 
lasted for about 1 hour, was audio recorded and transcribed verbatim for analysis.  
Table 1. List of interviews 
Interviewees Business unit 
RDD1 - Section Coordinator, Innovation 
R&D Department RDD2 - Section Coordinator, Operations 
RDD3 - Section Coordinator, Quality 
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RDD4 - Deputy Section Coordinator, New 
product research 
RDD5 - Deputy Section Coordinator, New 
product development 
RDD6 - Deputy Section Coordinator, Product 
update 
RDD7 - Deputy Section Coordinator, 
Materials and design 
RDD8 - Operational Manager 
SPD - General staff  Strategic Planning 
Department  
CD - General staff  Computing Division  
 
Based on the theoretical sensitivity [29] acquired with the review of the literature, the interview 
guide was designed to generate a deep understanding of several interlocking dimensions: the 
IXQFWLRQRIWKH5	'GHSDUWPHQWDQGWKHUROHLQIRUPDWLRQSOD\VZLWKLQLWSDUWLFLSDQWV¶MREUROH
and perceptions of information security threats and challenges; existent information security 
policies and controls; recovery from information security incidents; and recommendations to 
strengthen information security. Nonetheless, the questions were worded in a sufficiently open 
way DV WR DOORZ LQIRUPDQWV¶ UHFDOO DQG IUHHGLVFORVXUHRI WKHLU EHKDYLRXUV DQGSHUFHSWLRQV
towards information security. Table 2 below provides a complete overview of the semi-
structured interview guide employed for data collection. The guide was designed to keep the 
interview within the parameters defined by the objectives of study. Probing and follow-up 
questions were used to deepen response to questions and increase the richness of data.  
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Table 2. Semi-structured interview guide 
Questions 
 1. Can you describe the mission of the R&D department and how important 
the security of information is in your job role? 
2. Can you describe, in your opinion, what are the information security 
challenges of the R&D department? 
3. What in your view is the relationship between information security activities 
and the business goals of the R&D department?  
4. Is there a formal information security policy? How are information security 
matters managed across the organisation? 
5. What in your opinion are the greatest threats to information security at the 
R&D department?  
a) Have you experienced or known about any type of breach in the past? 
6. Do you feel there is a common understanding of information security and 
information security threats among the staff at the R&D department? 
7. What kind of tasks, responsibilities and routines relating to information 
security exist in the R&D department? 
a) Are there any practices that you consider important to develop?  
8. ,Q\RXURSLQLRQZKLFKIDFWRUVDIIHFWHPSOR\HHV¶LQIRUPDWLRQsecurity 
awareness? 
a) How important are relationships between employees? 
b) Do you have a training programme in place and induction for news staff? 
c) What is the role of rewards and punishments? 
9. Can you describe the current systems, practices and controls that are used 
to address information security matters? 
10. +RZDUHXVHUV¶DFWLRQVFRQWUROOHGORJJHGDQGDXGLWHG" 
11. :KDWLVWKH5	'¶VGHSDUWPHQWSROLF\RQemployees bringing their own 
computing devices to the workplace? 
12. How would the R&D department recover from an information security 
breach and resume business? 
a) What type of recovery plans or business continuity plans are in place? 
13. Is there anything you would change in the way departments and staff 
interact and are managed to improve the levels of information security? 
 
Once interview transcription was completed, the interviews were analysed following the 
inductive thematic analysis technique, whereby data is examined to identify a set of emergent 
themes. Inductive thematic analysis is a systematic method for ³LGHQWLI\LQJ DQDO\VLQJ DQG
reporting paWWHUQV WKHPHV ZLWKLQ GDWD´ >], and it is appropriate for analysing the data 
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collected from interpretive and qualitative methods. The coding transcripts developed 
collaboratively between the authors, following the principle of consensus, to ensure 
interpretive agreement and reliability. 
4. Findings 
Altogether, 10 themes referring to information security practices were identified: 
organisational mission statement; common understanding of information security; awareness 
of threats; information security incidents; information security routines; information security 
policy; relationships between employees; circulation of stories; punishment provisions; and 
training. Appendix 1 presents an overview of these themes, providing operational definitions 
that highlight their properties, alongside with representative interview quotations. 
4.1. Organisational mission statement 
7KHRUJDQLVDWLRQDOPLVVLRQVWDWHPHQWHPHUJHGDVDUHRFFXUULQJWKHPHLQLQIRUPDQWV¶DSSUDLVDO
of information security practices. Participants commonly stated that the mission of R&D 
Department is to design, plan and develop new and existing products up to the manufacturing 
stage, which entails dealing with different types of data that are critical business assets such as 
intellectual property, drawing data, modelling data, product specification details, etc. The 
following response from an operational manager illustrates this theme in action:  
 
I think that all information pertaining to the products that are handled and produced in this 
department is important, so the important information can really be all the different things 
related to the products such as the design of the product, the project and planning data, 
information on materials, specifications and so on [RDD3]. 
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4.2. Common understanding of information security 
Organisational insiders often recounted the role played by the existence of a common 
understaQGLQJ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ FKDOOHQJHV QRWDEO\ DQ DJUHHPHQW DURXQG WKH5	'¶V
department responsibility for handling and managing information in the most secure way. As 
stated by an R&D department coordinator:  
 
The information security challenge faced by the R&D team is to conduct business processes 
LQVHFXULW\ZKLFKPHDQVWRNHHSDOOWKHLPSRUWDQWGDWDVHFXUHGIURPXQDXWKRUL]HGSHUVRQV´
[RDD6].  
 
Although commonly shared amongst the majority the informants, this perception seemed more 
deeply ingrained in the discourse of coordinators and deputy coordinators and indeed a 
minority of employees recounted feeling less clear about the importance of talking through 
information security issues and the need to develop a common conceptual framework to tackle 
them. 
 
4.3. Awareness of threats 
Through individual accounts, participants recalled a series of externally-rooted security threats 
such as virus attacks, data loss due to hacker intervention, or information leakage. Security 
threats attributed to insiders were also frequent, as explained by a deputy section coordinator:  
 
Insider threat is another important source of threats that we need to consider. In other words, 
DGLVVDWLVILHGHPSOR\HHEDVHSURYLGHVDYHFWRUIRULQVLGHUVHFXULW\HYHQWV«7KHLQDGYHUWHQW
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leakage of information through removable devices or internet connections can make any 
employee the origination point for serious information security violations [RDD2]. 
 
Another type of threat identified by the Strategic Planning department refers to R&D 
knowledge loss occurring via job mobility and employee turnover:  
 
The company is ranked within the top performing firms in the field, hence a major threat 
comes from our employees changing jobs within the same field, and eventually sharing all 
the information with our competitors. In this very tight business area, R&D employees are 
often headhunted with higher salary prospects offered by a rival company in order to steal 
important information [SPD]. 
 
Overall, there seems to be recognition of a variety of threats but not enough proactive response. 
A deputy section coordinator reflects on the reasons that may originate this lack of 
proactiveness, and suggests that the negligent behaviour of staff may have a cultural 
foundation:  
 
Due to the fast development of the internet culture, everything can be easily shared and 
H[SRVHG DQG WKHUHIRUH WKLV FXOWXUH VWLFNV WR SHRSOH¶V HYHU\GD\ OLIH EHKDYLRXU 3HRSOH
unconsciously behave like this in their workplace when they should be thinking business 
[RDD5]. 
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4.4. Information security incidents 
Not all participants had experienced ± directly or indirectly ± the developing stages and the 
effects of information security incidents. This varying level of experience contributes to several 
participants constructing the notion that there are no major threats to the security of information 
and that the company does not have any formal disaster recovery plan in place. These accounts 
also reveal that there is insufficient knowledge on how to handle a security breach, should one 
occur. Only technical staff from the computing division was able to articulate and describe the 
incident control process, stating that: 
 
«XQGHUWKHFDVHRIVHFXULW\LQIULQJHPHQWZHILUVWFKHFNWKHGHWDLOHGLQIRUPDWLRQWKURXJK
network log, and then if it is later confirmed, we make efforts to prevent the recurrence of 
accidents, such as network access control and port block [CD].  
 
However, many respondents did not know how to manage the unexpected event of security 
breaches and to identify who is ultimately accountable for those situations. The most common 
answer was attributing responsibility to the individual directly triggering the incident, which 
further indicates a lack of awareness of line of authority and reporting procedures: 
  
Basically the contributor takes responsibility for the incident and the boss of his or her 
department is also responsible for neglecting the management and training [RDD7]. 
 
4.5. Information security routines 
The absence of actionable, repeated patterns of action that reinforce information security 
behaviour was identified as an area of concern by organisational insiders. The most commonly 
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mentioned tasks related to security are ensuring doors are locked and backing up data, but in 
general terms it was not felt that information security tasks were an integral component of R&D 
staff daily routines. The example below illustrates how the Strategic Department perceives this 
absence of established routines:  
 
There are no particular tasks and routines related to information security, but we are trying 
not to expose the information to the outside - we do not share materials, data and documents 
with other departments and other employees as well; and we only share these with accepted 
people in the same department, especially people who carry out same project and so the 
access is justified [SPD]. 
4.6. Information security policy 
Information security policy also arose as a recurrent theme, but largely due to the widely 
acknowledged absence of a formal security policy document in the firm. Only one deputy 
section coordinator claims that:  
«,WLVRIILFLDOO\IRUELGGHQWRWDNHSKRWRVLQVLGHWKH5	'GHSDUWPHQWWRDFFHVVSHUVRQDO
blogs and messaging applications, and to bring personal USBs and external hard drives 
[RDD1].  
 
However, the formal terms of policy are in VKDUSFRQWUDVWWRDGHSXW\VHFWLRQFRRUGLQDWRU¶V
DFNQRZOHGJHPHQW WKDW LQSUDFWLFH³DOOHPSOR\HHVDUHXVLQJ WKHLU VPDUWSKRQHVDQGD IHZRI
WKHPEULQJWDEOHWVIRUSHUVRQDOXVH´>5''@$QRWKHUXQUHJXODWHGGRPDLQLVHPSOR\HHV¶XVH
of their own personal devices for both work and leisure. Although tacitly permitted, the use of 
SHUVRQDOHOHFWURQLFGHYLFHVVXFKDVODSWRSVIRUZRUNSXUSRVHVLVQRWHQFRXUDJHG³LWLVDFFHSWHG
LILWIXOILOVEXVLQHVVQHHGVEXWLWLVQRWVXSSRUWHGE\WKHFRPSDQ\´>5''@7KHUHIRUHFDlls 
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IRU³WKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDV\VWHPDWLFPDQXDOIRULQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\WRUHVROYHWKHFRQIXVLRQ
RILQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\SUDFWLFHVDPRQJVWHPSOR\HHV´>5''@DUHQHDUO\XQDQLPRXV 
4.7. Relationships between employees 
Across interviews organisational LQVLGHUV¶ SHUFHSWLRQV GLYHUJHG FRQFHUQLQJ WKH LPSDFW RI
employee socialisation on the adherence to information security practices. Employees in the 
PLGGOHHFKHORQVWHQGHGWRFRQVLGHUWKDW³HPSOR\HHVVKRXOGEHXQLWHGDQGGHGLFDWHGWRWKHVDPH
goals as the oUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V´ >5''@ZKLFK LQFOXGHV WKHGLVFXVVLRQRI LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\
JRDOVLQWHUPVWKDWWKH\GHVFULEHDV³KRUL]RQWDO´DQG³PXWXDOO\EHQHILFLDO´2QWKHRWKHUKDQG
participants holding senior managerial positions such as section coordinators tended to believe 
WKDW³WKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVWDIIGRHVQRWDIIHFWLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\DFWLYLW\EHFDXVH7H[WLOH
ĮLVDPHGLXPVL]HILUP´>5''@ 
4.8. Circulation of stories 
7KHOLPLWHGGLVFORVXUHRIRUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQVLGHUV¶H[SHULHQFHRILQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\LQcidents 
and a reported blanket of silence surrounding the existence of damage resulting from 
previously undiscussed information security incidents contributed to a generalised feeling of 
apathy, reinforced by the limited circulation of stories that could instead help articulate 
H[SHULHQFHDQGPDNHXSRUJDQLVDWLRQDO LQVLGHUV¶XQGHUVWDQGLQJVRI LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\ dos 
DQGGRQ¶WV. An example of how stories as a way of remembering personal and organisational 
meaning could have been used is reccounted by the Strategic Planning Department when 
recalling a virus attack incident: 
 
'XHWRWKHYLUXVDWWDFNZHKDGUXQLQWRDSUREOHPZLWKWKHSRRUQHWZRUN«:HFRXOGQRW
use the internet properly and therefore it caused that we could not send and receive files, 
complete tasks and exchange messages with co-workers in other branches [SPD]. 
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The opacity surrounding this event and the absence of narrative mechanisms stood in the way 
of organisational insiders talking about the real experience of their organisation and reflecting 
on shared perceptions of dealing with information security incidents. In this particular example, 
different interpretations surrounding the incident were selected, legitimised and 
institutionalised, as the R&D department coordinator downplays its consequences and frames 
LQFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWWHUPV³WKHFRPSDQ\KDGDYLUXVDWWDFNEHIRUHEXWLW was not of great 
FRQFHUQ´>5'']. 
4.9. Punishment provisions 
Building up on the absence of established organisational narratives of information security 
incidents, and on the lack of reporting mechanisms, organisational insiders denounced the 
lenient way in which the firm deals with employee faults associated with the inexistence of 
punishment provisions in case of information security breach. Both aspects are linked by 
participants to the dominant family-like organisational culture, where there is room for 
forgiveness of light faults, but where serious mistakes are heavy-handedly punished: 
 
There is no particular punishment system, because the culture of the company is like family 
feeling, the atmosphere of the company is such that the supervisor kindly leads his or her 
subordinates. Therefore, if an employee makes a mistake, his or her superior helps them to 
do better, not blaming or punishing the employee. However, if the employee causes 
extensive damage, commits a fatal mistake or his malicious action has negative effect within 
the company, the company may give notice of dismissal [RDD7]. 
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4.10. Training 
Information security awareness training was described by organisational insiders as superficial 
and unsystematic, although participants acknowledge its benefits: 
 
Establishing information security policy and training employees about information security 
would be helpful to understand the proper security attitude and behaviour [RDD6]. 
 
Given the absence of procedure-oriented security policies, organisational insiders recalled only 
the existence of induction training for new staff, focusing mainly on the technically-oriented 
dimensions of information security and usually taking amid introductions to other staff, guided 
YLVLWVWRWKHILUP¶VSUHPLVHVDQGWKURXJKGLUHFWFRQWDFWZLWKVHQLRUVWDII³we do not have a 
IRUPDOWUDLQLQJSURJUDPPHEXWQHZVWDIIDUHLQGLYLGXDOO\HGXFDWHGE\WKHLUVXSHULRU´>5''@ 
The following section discusses the themes emerging from the analysis and situates them in 
the wider context of the information security literature. 
 
5. Discussion 
The enculturation of information security within organisations requires the implementation and 
management of technical, social, formal and informal controls. The actions and behaviour of 
organisational insiders, in particular, are recognised as one of the most significant enablers of 
information security success [43, 46], but the human factor is often overlooked [58, 79]. In 
7H[WLOHĮWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJHVLVXQHYHQDPRQJRUJDQLVDWLRQDO
insiders, although specific threats such as the intentional or unintentional behaviour of 
organisational insiders and knowledge leakage due to employee turnover were reported more 
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IUHTXHQWO\DFURVVSDUWLFLSDQWV¶DFFRXQWV6LPLODUWKUHDWVDUHHFKRHGLQWKHLQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\
literature [17]. 
The successful management of information security requires an integrated approach to the 
administration of people, policies and programmes that simultaneously delivers operational 
objectives and preserves strategic alignment witKWKHRUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VPLVVLRQ>]. Small and 
medium size enterprises often find this integrated approach to the management of information 
security challenging, more specifically the establishment of security policies and the conduct 
of risk assessments, since they frequently lack the human and financial resources to coordinate 
information security [66, 74, 97, 98]. TexWLOHĮILWVWKLVGHVFULption and organisational insiders 
report the absence of a formal security policy. Nevertheless, the literature identifies information 
security policy as one of the main components of effective information security management 
and it can assist to enable security-inducing practices [54]. According to Kankanhalli et al. 
[74], policy statements and guidelines can inform the design of information security activities, 
spanning from controls on the legitimate use of information assets to the deployment of more 
advanced security methodologies. Such policy instruments can also help to reduce instances 
where employees handle security software without adequate information security knowledge 
[101]. 
The existence of training programmes can help organisational insiders understand the 
context of information security policy, and develop awareness of information security practices 
[72, 101]. Furthermore, the education of employees on the roles and responsibilities related to 
security can contribute to the reduction of incidents [102]. Despite acknowledging the 
importance of training programmes in the development of information security awareness, 
RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LQVLGHUV ZLWKLQ 7H[WLOH Į GHVFULEH WKH XQV\VWHPDWLF QDWXUH RI WUDLQLQJ
opportunities available. 
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Information security awareness training can be enhanced through integration with the 
RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VHVWDEOLVKHGFRPPXQLFDWLRQSURFHVVHVHJSURGXFWGHYHORSPHQWPHHWLngs) and 
training programmes [67]. This can help employees internalise roles and responsibilities and 
make sHFXULW\WDVNVDQLQWHJUDOSDUWRIWKHLUGDLO\URXWLQHVVRPHWKLQJ7H[WLOHĮKDVEHHQXQDEOH
to achieve, partly also due to the limited circulation of stories describing, reflecting and 
extracting learning from the occurrence of previous information security incidents. In reality, 
when reporting mechanisms are lacking, incidents are covered in a blanket of silence that 
obliterates opportunities for organisational learning. The impact of learning through social 
LQWHUDFWLRQLVDOVROLPLWHGLQ7H[WLOHĮGXHWRambivalent views on the potential of taking social 
cues and enacting values from interactions on the job with other organisational actors. The 
UHVLVWDQFH LGHQWLILHG LQ 7H[WLOH Į¶V VHQLRU HPSOR\HHV FRQWUDGLFWV WKH JHQHUDO DVVXPSWLRQ
conveyed in the literature that relationships between organisational insiders encourage greater 
awareness of information security threats, information policy compliance, and collaboration in 
case of information security incidents [68, 71, 101].  
Finally, in line with a variety of studies that raise the pernicious effect of penalties and 
punishment as a deterrence approach [71, 74@7H[WLOHĮGRHVQRWKDYHDQHVWDEOLVKHGSROLF\
that enforces punishment provisions in case of information security breach, although severe 
misconduct leads to staff dismissal. 
Overall, the themes identified and discussed in the paper add to the stream of studies that 
KDYHDGYDQFHGWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRILQGLYLGXDOV¶PRWLYDWLRQVDQGWKHSURFHVVHVDVVRFLDWHGWR
decision-making concerning compliance or non-compliance with information security 
SURFHGXUHVDQGSROLFLHV2QWKHRQHKDQGWKHWKHPHVRI³DZDUHQHVVRIWKUHDWV´³LQIRUPDWLRQ
VHFXULW\ LQFLGHQWV´ ´LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ URXWLQHV´ ³LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ SROLF\´
³UHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ HPSOR\HHV´ ´SXQLVKPHQW SURYLVLRQV´ DQG ³WUDLQLQJ´  DOLJQZLWK and 
complement studies that have explored the extent to which individuals conform to what is 
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prescribed by organisational information security policy, and the ways in which individuals 
evaluate and respond to information security threats. This includes the concepts of: attitude 
towards security [101, 102]; self-efficacy, denoting ability and expertise to enable security 
measures [38, 103]; commitment, denoting willingness to invest energy and effort in ensuring 
organisational practices that conform to information security [102, 103]; compliance 
behavioural intentions [101, 104]; involvement, denoting an attempt to build relationships in 
connection with information security [101, 103]; the severity of sanctions in case of offence 
[102, 104] and information richness and its impact on security awareness training effectiveness 
[105]. 
2Q WKH RWKHU KDQG WKH WKHPHV RI ³RUJDQLVDWLRQDO PLVVLRQ VWDWHPHQW´ ³FRPPRQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\´ DQG ³FLUFXODWLRQ RI VWRULHV´ DGYDQFH the 
understanding of information security practices through addressing the critical issue of how to 
turn organisational insiders into information security allies, as opposed to the prevalent view 
of insiders as a latent source of risk. More spHFLILFDOO\³RUJDQLVDWLRQDOPLVVLRQVWDWHPHQW´DQG
³FRPPRQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\´ WKHRULVH KRZ WKH LPDJHV RUJDQLVDWLRQDO
LQVLGHUV¶KROGRIRUJDQLVDWLRQVHIIHFWLYHO\DFWDVSRZHUIXOVKDSHUVRIWKHLURZQLGHQWLILFDWLRQ
with the organisation tKH\ DUH DIILOLDWHG ZLWK DNLQ WR 'XWWRQ HW DO¶V SURSRVDO WKDW ³VWURQJ
organizational identification may translate into desirable outcomes such as intraorganizational 
FRRSHUDWLRQRUFLWL]HQVKLSEHKDYLRXUV´ [106]. In other words, if insiders believe in the central 
DQGHQGXULQJQDWXUHRILQIRUPDWLRQDQGLWVVHFXULW\IRUWKHLURUJDQLVDWLRQ¶VSHUIRUPDQFHWKH\
will be more attuned to its future viability and therefore direct increased effort into practices 
that signify and operationalise that commitment. As for WKH UROH SOD\HG WKH ³FLUFXODWLRQ RI
VWRULHV´WKHWKHPHKLJKOLJKWVKHYLWDOUROHSOD\HGE\QDUUDWLYHVDVRUJDQLVDWLRQDOVHQVHPDNLQJ
mechanisms [107] that socialise employees, generate commitment [108] and provide a medium 
for capturing organisational knowledge [109]. The absence of a stock of stories actively 
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circulating is interpreted as manifestation of both organisational silence and ignorance, through 
the deliberate cultivation of taboos and conscious denials [110], suppressed employee voice 
[111] or thHIHHOLQJWKDWRQH¶VRSLQLRQVDUHQRWYDOXHG [112]. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Information security efforts tend to focus mainly on the technical implementation details, 
which typically results on a limited integration with existing organisational processes and on 
the absence of a holistic information protection strategy that is sensitive to organisational 
LQVLGHUV¶ QHHGV DQG DVSLUDWLRQV %DVHG RQ WKH DXVFXOWDWLRQ RI RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LQVLGHUV¶
perceptions, the following practices can inform the development of more successful 
information security strategies:  
 
1. An upfront determination of clear goals and objectives. Organisational information 
security strategies should help achieve strategic business objectives, so clear objectives 
EDVHG RQ WKH RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V PLVVLRQ DUH DQ HVsential step in ensuring that the 
information security strategy protects the information assets that are key to the business. 
This should have input from various business and operating units, so that organisation-
wide participation, understanding and acceptance are unlocked. 
 
2. Definition and organisation-wide understanding of sensitive (valuable, inimitable and 
non-substitutable) information assets, so that associated sensitivity risks are assessed 
and proper controls are implemented (e.g. information flows monitoring).  
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3. Holistically addressing the people, process and technology dimensions, so that 
organisations assign clear roles and responsibilities for individuals, rely on fit-for-
purpose tools to prevent and identify information security threats, and operate based on 
effective and well known processes to report, investigate, and respond to incidents. 
 
4. Reinforcing awareness mechanisms, to enable an environment where organisational 
insiders learn and adhere to social norms and values, more specifically the importance 
RI WKHLU RUJDQLVDWLRQ¶V LQIRUPDWLRQ VHFXULW\ SUDFWLFHV 7KLV VKRXOG GHYHORS WKURXJK
encouraging greater organisational bonding (e.g. regular meetings to discuss security 
events and concerns), and through security awareness sessions and training designed to 
VKDSH RUJDQLVDWLRQDO LQVLGHUV¶ DWWLWXGHV DQG WR XOWLPDWHO\ HTXLS WKHP ZLWK WKH
knowledge and skills necessary to assume responsibility for the safeguard of 
information assets. Part of the awareness mechanisms should also be a compliance 
auditiQJHIIRUWIRFXVHGRQWHVWLQJDQGYDOLGDWLQJRUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQVLGHUV¶NQRZOHGJHRI
information security threats and practices, and on ensuring that a continuous 
improvement cycle is in place.  
 
The adoption of a practice approach that conceptualises information security as something 
organisational insiders do, enables information science researchers to further understand how 
information security strategy is carried out, who are the agents of strategy work, and what 
resources are mobilised to conduct this woUN6LPLODUO\LQFRQVLGHULQJRUJDQLVDWLRQDOLQVLGHUV¶
knowledge of information security as practical accomplishment, this paper contributes to 
advance understanding of how information security-related knowledge is produced, 
internalised and performed in routine work practices. Future research can extend this effort and 
further investigate the discursive practices of those who govern information security strategies 
 29 
and actively shape the environment where organisational insiders learn about organisational 
values, in order to establish the impact of organisational citizenship behaviour on information 
security compliance.  
 
 
Notes 
1. This paper adopts the taxonomy proposed by Yusuf [90], where OBM stands for original 
EUDQGPDQXIDFWXULQJDQG LVGHILQHGDV³VHOOLQJWKHSURGXFWVXQGHU LWVRZQEUDQG´,QWKH
same taxonomy, ODM refers to original design manufacturing and entails dealing with the 
IXQFWLRQV IURP ³SRVWFRQFHSWXDO GHVLJQ WR WKH PDQXIDFWXULQJ´ )LQDOO\ 2(0 RULJLQDO
equipment manufacturing) refers to firms that only engage in the manufacturing of 
components following the specifications provided by clientes. 
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Appendix 1 ± Themes definition and illustrative quotations 
 
Themes Operational definition Illustrative quotations 
 
Organisational 
mission 
statement 
 
Shared value system, 
behavioural guidelines 
and focus on common 
objectives 
 
³7KHPLVVLRQRIWKH5	'GHSDUWPHQWLV
to promote, develop and facilitate 
creative endeavours and research, to 
provide innovative and sustainable 
solutions to societal challenges in the 
field of product manufacturing and 
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designs. Their integrity needs 
SURWHFWLRQ´>5''@ 
 
Common 
understanding 
of information 
security 
 
(PSOR\HHV¶FRPPRQ
understanding of 
information security 
challenges  
³,WKLQNSDUWO\WKHWRSPDQDJHPHQW
people considers information security 
WKUHDWVVHULRXVO\EXWIRURWKHUV,GRQ¶W
think they care that much about 
LQIRUPDWLRQVHFXULW\DWZRUN´>5''@ 
Awareness of 
threats 
Variations in the extent 
to which employees 
are knowledgeable of 
information security 
topics and threats 
³7KHUHDUHSRVVLEOHWKUHDWVWR
information security that come from a 
easy outside access through the 
Internet. Most of our data and files are 
exchanged as e-mail attachments or 
instant messaging applications. Also, a 
lot of confidential information such as 
drawings and the design of products 
become exposed because it ends up in 
a print out. But above all, I think the 
most threatening factor is how little 
VHFXULW\FRQVFLRXVHPSOR\HHVFDQEH´
[CD]. 
 
Information 
security 
incidents 
Experiences with 
information security 
³'LUHFWUHVSRQVLELOLW\UHVWVZLWKWKH
SHUVRQZKRFDXVHVDVHFXULW\EUHDFK´
[RDD7]. 
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incident response and 
handling.  
 
Information 
security 
routines 
Repeated patterns of 
action that reinforce 
information security 
³7KHUHLVQRSDUWLFXODUURXWLQHrelated to 
information security but we try not to 
H[SRVHRXUVHOYHVWRWKHRXWVLGH´>63'@ 
 
Information 
security policy 
Management direction 
and support for 
information security  
³7KHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDV\VWHPDWLF
manual for information security would 
be necessary to resolve confusion and 
bring information security practices to all 
HPSOR\HHV´>5''@ 
 
Relationships 
between 
employees 
Adherence to 
information security 
practices through 
socialisation 
³$ERQGRIV\PSDWK\KDVGHYHORSHG
among employees that helps 
understanding the importance of 
VHFXULW\DQGVHFXULW\WKUHDWV´>&'@ 
 
Circulation of 
stories 
 
Circulation of storied 
information security 
breaches recalled by 
employees  
 
 
³7KHFRPSDQ\KDVDOUHDG\H[SHULHQFHG
DYLUXVDWWDFN´>5''@ 
Punishment 
provisions 
Existence of rewards 
as an incentive for 
³,GRQ¶WNQRZZKHWKHUWKHUHLVDV\VWHP
of rewards and punishments because I 
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exemplary security 
behaviour, and 
punishments to 
penalize negligent 
behaviour 
 
KDYHQRWEHHQUHZDUGHGRUSXQLVKHG´
[RDD6]. 
Training Induction, orientation 
and training activities 
focused on information 
security 
³:HGRQ¶WKDYHDQ\IRUPDOLQGXFWLRQEXW
for the new staff we have a get-together 
PHHWLQJDIWHUZRUN´>5''@ 
 
 
